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lose sight of such important considerations as: the court's ability to
enforce a judgement;18 the potential for confusion in interpreting
the laws of the state of incorporation; 19 and the possibility that the
state of incorporation could better adjudicate the issue.20 By ad-
dressing these concerns, the courts will preserve the value of the
internal affairs rule as an element in forum non conveniens
determinations. 2'
Joseph J. Pash, Jr.
CPLR 6501: Notice of pendency improper in action involving con-
tract for the sale of stock representing the beneficial ownership of
real property
Section 6501 of the CPLR permits a plaintiff to file a notice of
pendency in any action if the title, possession, use or enjoyment of
real property may be affected by the judgment demanded.' The
filing of a notice of pendency 2 gives constructive notice of the liti-
18 See Sternfeld v. Toxaway Tanning Co., 290 N.Y. 294, 297, 49 N.E.2d 145, 145 (1943);
17 W. FLETCHER, supra note 4, at § 8426; Note, The Development of the "Internal Affairs"
Rule in the Federal Courts and its Future Under Erie v. Tompkins, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 413,
415-16 (1946).
"I See Adolph Meyer, Inc. v. Florists' Tel. Delivery Ass'n, 36 Misc. 2d 566, 567-68, 232
N.Y.S.2d 913, 915 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1962).
20 See Langfelder v. Universal Laboratories, Inc., 293 N.Y. 200, 204, 56 N.E.2d 550, 552
(1944).
21 See generally Reese & Kaufmann, The Law Governing Corporate Affairs: Choice of
Law and the Impact of Full Faith and Credit, 58 COLUt. L. REV. 1118, 1124-28 (1958);
Latty, supra note 4, at 143-62; Note, Substitute, supra note 4, at 249-50.
See CPLR 6501 (1980). Section 6501 of the CPLR provides in pertinent part:
A notice of pendency may be filed in any action in a court of the state or of the
United States in which the judgment demanded would affect the title to, or the
possession, use or enjoyment of, real property.
Id.; see, e.g., Braunston v. Anchorage Woods, Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 302, 304-05, 178 N.E.2d 717,
718, 222 N.Y.S.2d 316, 317-18 (1961) (notice of pendency inapplicable when suit concerns
encroachment); Sourian v. Saleh, 50 App. Div. 2d 756, 756, 376 N.Y.S.2d 166, 167 (1st Dep't
1975) (action to prevent landowner from committing wrong on plaintiff not proper subject
of notice of pendency); General Property Corp. v. Diamond, 29 App. Div. 2d 173, 175, 286
N.Y.S.2d 553, 554 (1st Dep't 1968) (filing proper when judgment would affect possession).
2 A notice of pendency is sometimes called a lis pendens. 7A WK&M % 6501.04, at 65-9
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gation to any person who subsequently purchases or encumbers the
realty.3 The use of this provisional remedy4 in actions concerning
the sale of corporate stock generally has been unsuccessful because
such transactions do not directly relate to realty.
Despite the increasing hybridization of the corporate form and
the ownership of real property,6 the Court of Appeals in 5303 Re-
(1984). It should be noted that the term "lis pendens" is used to denote the common law
remedy, while "notice of pendency" is used in the new CPLR to denote the statutory notice.
Id. The terms will be referred to in this survey accordingly.
3 See Flushing Sav. Bank v. CNN Realty Corp., 82 App. Div. 2d 907, 908, 440 N.Y.S.2d
699, 700 (2d Dep't 1981); Levine v. Carr, 33 Misc. 2d 425, 426, 215 N.Y.S.2d 402, 404 (Sup.
Ct. Nassau County 1961); CPLR 6501 (1980); 7A WK&M T 6501.02, at 65-6 to 65-7. Persons
with such constructive notice of the pending litigation can purchase or encumber only the
property subject to the outcome of the action. See Halley v. Ano, 136 N.Y. 569, 574 (1893);
Levine, 33 Misc. 2d at 426, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 404; Comment, Abuses of the California Lis
Pendens: An Appeal for Legislative Remedy, 39 S. CAL. L. REv. 108, 109 (1966); 7A WK&M
1 6501.01, at 65-3 to 65-4.
At common law the lis pendens attached upon service of the subpoena and the com-
mencement of the suit. See 7A WK&M T 6501.01, at 65-6; Decisions, Real Property-Lis
Pendens-Action to Enjoin a Nuisance, 28 BROOKLYN L. Rav. 349, 349 n.7 (1962). The pur-
pose of this remedy was to ensure that the plaintiff's action was not impeded or defeated by
alienation of the property during the action, see The Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v.
Fox, 544 F. Supp. 542, 548 (N.D.N.Y. 1982); Braunston v. Anchorage Woods, Inc., 10 N.Y.2d
302, 304-05, 178 N.E.2d 717, 718, 222 N.Y.S.2d 316, 317-18 (1961); Hercules Chem. Co. v.
VCI Inc., 118 Misc. 2d 814, 817, 462 N.Y.S.2d 129, 132 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983), and to
permit the court to render a meaningful judgment, see Hailey, 136 N.Y. at 574-75 (suit
might be interminable). This procedure caused purchasers of real property considerable
hardship; many state legislatures required that formal notice be given. See SECOND ANN.
REP. N.Y. JUD. CONFERENCE 107, 107 (1957); Note, A Proposal for Reformation of the Iowa
Lis Pendens, 67 IOWA L. Rav. 289, 291 (1982); Comment, supra, at 109-10; 7A WK&M 1
6501.01-6501.02, at 65-6 to 65-7.
4 SIEGEL § 306, at 361 (1982). A notice of pendency is provisional because it offers the
plaintiff protection only during the pendency of the action. Id.; see also CPLR 6001 (Article
60 of the CPLR lists five provisional remedies: arrest, attachment, injunction, receivership
and notice of pendency).
" See, e.g., Holbrook v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 57 N.Y. 616, 632 (1874) (lis pendens not
applicable to "an action concerning the title to stocks"); Leitch v. Wells, 48 N.Y. 585, 613
(1872) ("articles of commerce" excluded from lis pendens); see infra note 24 and accompa-
nying text; accord American Press Ass'n v. Brantingham, 75 App. Div. 435, 437, 78 N.Y.S.
305, 307 (1st Dep't 1902); Note, The Application of Lis Pendens to Personalty, 47 HARv. L
REv. 1023, 1026 (1934); infra note 30.
" See Note, Legal Characterization of the Individual's Interest in a Cooperative
Apartment: Realty or Personalty? 73 COLUM. L. REv. 250, 256 (1973). With the marked in-
crease of cooperative apartment ownership, see Berger, Condominium: Shelter on a Statu-
tory Foundation, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 987, 992 n.25 (1963), courts have recognized a "hybrid"
between stock ownership and a proprietary interest, see State Tax Comm'n v. Shor, 43
N.Y.2d 151, 154, 371 N.E.2d 523, 524-25, 400 N.Y.S.2d 805, 806 (1977); Note, supra, at 256.
Consequently, the courts consider cooperative ownership to be, in part, an interest in real
property deserving of traditional real property protections. Note, supra, at 257. However,
the distinction between the ownership of stock in a corporation whose sole asset is a build-
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alty Corp. v. 0 & Y Equity Corp.,7 recently adhered to a strict
construction of CPLR 6501, holding that a notice of pendency will
not be granted in an action for the specific performance of a con-
tract for the sale of stock representing the beneficial ownership of
real property.8
In 5303 Realty Corp., the plaintiff contracted to purchase
from the defendant a Manhattan office building and the underly-
ing land.' The transaction was structured as a sale of stock rather
than as a transfer of the title by deed.10 As a result of the defen-
dant's alleged breach of certain provisions in the contract, the clos-
ing never occurred.11 The plaintiff instituted an action requesting
specific performance, and subsequently filed a notice of pendency
against the property.12 The Supreme Court, Special Term, denied
a motion by the defendant to cancel the notice, holding that the
complaint, on its face, entitled the plaintiff to a notice of pen-
dency. 3 The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed.' 4
ing, and the stock ownership in a cooperative, is that the cooperative shareholder is entitled
to a proprietary lease that represents the real property interest. Shor, 43 N.Y.2d at 156, 371
N.E.2d at 526, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 808; Note, supra, at 253; Comment, A Survey of the Legal
Aspects of Cooperative Apartment Ownership, 16 MIA I L. REv. 305, 310-11 (1961). The
leasehold and shareholder interests are inseparable. Shor, 43 N.Y.2d at 154, 371 N.E.2d at
524-25, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 806; Note, Cooperative Apartments-A Legal Hybrid, 13 U. FLA. L.
REv. 123, 125 (1960).
7 64 N.Y.2d 313, 476 N.E.2d 276, 486 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1984).
8 Id. at 316, 476 N.E.2d at 278, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 879.
9 Id.
10 Id. 0 & Y Equity Corporation (Equity) wholly owned 41 Fifth Ave Realty Corp. (the
Corporation). This realty corporation was a general partner owning a 97% interest in the
limited partnership. The contract further stipulated that Equity would cause the limited
partners to sell their interest to the plaintiff. The contract was allegedly structured in this
manner at the request of the defendants to avoid over half a million dollars in New York
City Real Property Transfer Taxes. See 98 App. Div. 2d 632, 632, 469 N.Y.S.2d 388, 388 (1st
Dep't 1983), rev'd, 64 N.Y.2d 313, 476 N.E.2d 276, 486 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1984). The tax would
be avoided because the real property would vest in the surviving corporation, and therefore
the deed would never be transferred. See Torrey Delivery Inc. v. Chautauqua Truck Sales &
Serv. Inc., 47 App. Div. 2d 279, 283, 366 N.Y.S.2d 506, 511 (4th Dep't 1975).
11 64 N.Y.2d at 317, 476 N.E.2d at 278, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 879. Plaintiff claimed that non-
compliance caused irreparable injury, thereby making closing impossible. Id.
12 Id. at 317, 476 N.E.2d at 279, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 880. The filed notice described the
action as one to enforce a contract to transfer fee ownership and to gain possession of prop-
erty. Id.
13 Id. The supreme court did not consider the effect of an amended complaint alleging
fraudulent conduct by the defendants. Id. Courts assume that the allegations in the com-
plaint are true, and therefore the complaint does not have to manifest the likelihood of
success. See Fontanarosa v. Ryan, 51 N.Y.S.2d 951, 952 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1944).
14 98 App. Div. 2d 632, 469 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1st Dep't 1983), rev'd, 64 N.Y.2d 313, 476
N.E.2d 276, 486 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1984). The court reasoned that the contract in 5303 Realty
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On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, 5 holding that an
action for specific performance of a contract "for the sale of stock
representing a beneficial ownership of real estate will not support
the filing of a notice of pendency.' Chief Justice Cooke, writing for
the majority,'7 reasoned that both the "relative procedural ease"
with which a notice of pendency can be filed and the drastic effect
that such a filing has on a defendant's title require a strict con-
struction of the statute.'8 Accordingly, the Court determined that,
to justify the filing of a notice of pendency, an action must be di-
rectly related to real property, especially in cases concerning per-
sonal property which represents the beneficial ownership of real
property. 9 After establishing that the essence of the action was to
enforce a contract to sell stock, 0 Chief Justice Cooke concluded
that a direct relationship to realty could not exist because the own-
ership of corporate stock and the ownership of property are mutu-
ally exclusive. 2' Moreover, the Court observed that other "protec-
tive devices" were available that would allow for judicial review of
the underlying merits of the action. 2
had the same net effect as a sale of real property. Id. at 632, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 389.
:5 64 N.Y.2d at 325, 476 N.E.2d at 284, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 885.
16 Id. at 316, 476 N.E.2d at 278, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 879.
1 7 Id. at 315, 476 N.E.2d at 278, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 879. Judges Jones, Wachtler, Meyer,
Simons and Kaye concur, with Judge Jasen dissenting. Id. at 326, 476 N.E.2d at 285, 486
N.Y.S.2d at 886. Dissenting, Judge Jasen contended that the filing of a notice of pendency
was proper because the judgment demanded by the plaintiff would affect a "specific parcel
of real property." Id. at 325, 476 N.E.2d at 284, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 885 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
Judge Jasen noted that, "[iun recognition of the hybridization of modern applications of
corporate law and traditional protections accorded to realty transfers, courts have sought to
render such potentially divergent approaches complementary, rather than mutually exclu-
sive." Id. (Jasen, J., dissenting). The dissent maintained that the majority's analysis of the
transaction elevated "form over substance" and, therefore, completely disregarded "eco-
nomic reality." Id. (Jasen, J., dissenting). But see id. at 323 n.7, 476 N.E.2d at 283 n.7, 486
N.Y.S.2d at 884 n.7 (majority noted that cases dissent relied on concerned "the special na-
ture of shares in cooperative apartment buildings"). Moreover, the dissent asserted that the
majority's analysis raised significant questions regarding the applicability of "other devices
designed to limit purchaser risks." Id. at 326, 476 N.E.2d at 284, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 885 (Jasen,
J., dissenting). Judge Jasen reasoned that if the transfer of stock that represents realty is
not considered a transaction involving real property, under CPLR 6501, it is doubtful that
the transaction falls within the protection of the Recording Act, Real Property Law 290, the
Statute of Frauds, GOL § 5-703, or that insurance companies can issue title insurance on
such transactions. Id. at 326, 476 N.E.2d at 285, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 886 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
18 Id. at 323, 476 N.E.2d at 283, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 884; see supra note 3.
64 N.Y.2d at 321, 476 N.E.2d at 281, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 882.
20 Id. at 323, 476 N.E.2d at 283, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 884.
21 Id.; see infra notes 26 & 27 and accompanying text.
22 64 N.Y.2d at 324, 476 N.E.2d at 283, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 884. Other courts have noted
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It is submitted that the Court of Appeals' decision to restrict
the application of notices of pendency to actions directly affecting
realty was proper in light of the harshness of the remedy, the dis-
tinctions between stock ownership and the ownership of real prop-
erty, and the procedural due process problems that could arise
from an overbroad application of the statute.
Indeed, the notice of pendency is considered to be a harsh
remedy because it results in the suspension or reduction of a de-
fendant's property rights before any adjudication on the merits.23
Consequently, courts have strictly construed CPLR 6501, refusing
to grant notices of pendency in actions based upon stock transac-
tions and in other cases not directly affecting real property.24
that alternative forms of protection are available. See, e.g., Braunston v. Anchorage Woods,
Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 302, 306, 178 N.E.2d 717, 719, 222 N.Y.S.2d 318, 319 (1961); Chambi v.
Navarro, Vives & Cia, Ltd., 95 App. Div. 2d 667, 667, 463 N.Y.S.2d 218, 219 (1st Dep't 1983)
(attachment, temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction); Mageloff v. Sarkin, 52
Misc. 2d 737, 740, 276 N.Y.S.2d 708, 710 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1966) (attachment,
injunction).
In contrast to the ease with which a notice of pendency may be filed, see infra note 31,
the other provisional remedies have stricter requirements, see SIEGEL §§ 306-342. For exam-
ple, to obtain an injunction the moving party would be required to establish a likelihood of
ultimate success on the merits. See Paine & Chriscott v. Blair House Assoc., 70 App. Div. 2d
571, 572, 417 N.Y.S.2d 68, 69 (1st Dep't 1979) (irreparable injury, balance of equities in his
favor, and clear legal right to relief sought); DeCandido v. Young Stars, Inc., 10 App. Div. 2d
922, 922, 200 N.Y.S.2d 695, 696 (1st Dep't 1968) (injunction should not be granted unless
clear legal right and irreparable damages are shown).
23 See SIEGEL § 306, at 363. Courts and commentators have recognized serious conse-
quences resulting from the filing of the notice of pendency. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Fed-
ders Corp., 670 F.2d 1316, 1319 (3d Cir. 1982) (severely restricts ability to convey); Hercules
Chem. Co. v. VCI, Inc., 118 Misc. 2d 814, 818, 462 N.Y.S.2d 129, 132 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1983) (restricts power of conveyance); Casenote, Lis Pendens and Procedural Due Process,
1 PEPPERDINE L. Rzv. 433, 437 (1974) (hinders ability to obtain credit; threatened loss of
profits forces quick settlement). But cf. 7A WK&M 6501.13, at 65-32 (1984) (notice of
pendency does not necessarily render title unmarketable or defective).
24 See, e.g., Holbrook v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 57 N.Y. 616, 627-29 (1874); Leitch v.
Wells, 48 N.Y. 585, 613 (1872); Ciambi v. Navarro, Vives & Cia Ltd., 95 App. Div. 2d 667,
667, 463 N.Y.S.2d 218, 218 (1st Dep't 1983); Deerfield Bldg. Corp. v. Yorkstate Indus., Inc.,
77 Misc. 2d 302, 304-05, 353 N.Y.S.2d 331, 334 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1974).
In Ciambi, a notice of pendency was denied where the plaintiff contracted to purchase
all of the shares of a corporation whose sole asset was a building. 95 App. Div. 2d at 667, 463
N.Y.S.2d at 218. The court asserted that the stock transaction was only indirectly related to
the sale of the property and concluded that the judgment demanded would affect only the
ownership of the stock. See id., 463 N.Y.S.2d at 219; see also General Property Corp. v.
Diamond, 29 App. Div. 2d 173, 175, 286 N.Y.S.2d 553, 554-55 (1st Dep't 1968) (interest in
joint venture having to do with realty is not realty in itself); Whittemore v. DePasquale, 8
App. Div. 2d 793, 794, 187 N.Y.S.2d 53, 54 (1st Dep't 1959) (notice of pendency improper in
suit to compel issuance of stock in corporation owning realty); Arcaro v. Arcaro, 20 Misc. 2d
489, 490-91, 193 N.Y.S.2d 493, 494 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1959) (notice of pendency inap-
1 qR5]
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The assertion that the adjudication of stock transaction cases
cannot directly affect real property is based upon the fundamental
principle that the assets of a corporation are the property of the
corporate entity and not the stockholders. 5 While the stock repre-
sents a proportionate interest in any real property owned by the
corporation,26 a stockholder- even a sole stockholder-does not
own the property and does not have any legal right to title or pos-
27session. A notice of pendency might have been appropriate in
5303 Realty Corp. if the plaintiff had pierced the corporate veil by
proving the requisite misuse of the corporate form, (i.e. by fraud,
or illegality).28 However, the Court did not consider the plaintiff's
allegations of fraudulent conduct.2 9
It is submitted that the Court of Appeals' decision to restrict
the use of notices of pendency was especially prudent because a
broader interpretation of 6501 is susceptible to constitutional at-
plicable when partnership assets used to purchase realty in name of corporation).
25 See Elenkrieg v. Siebrecht, 238 N.Y. 254, 262-63, 144 N.E. 519, 521-22 (1924); Grant
v. Adler, 30 App. Div. 2d 657, 657-58, 291 N.Y.S.2d 206, 207-08 (1st Dep't 1968).
Clearly, one fundamental principle of modern economic life is that a corporate entity
exists separate from and independently of its shareholders. See Jenkins v. Moyse, 254 N.Y.
319, 324, 172 N.E. 521, 522 (1930); Cone v. Acme Mkts., Inc., 41 App. Div. 2d 409, 412, 343
N.Y.S.2d 765, 768 (4th Dep't 1973). The concentration of stock ownership has no effect on
the ownership of the corporate entities ownership. See State v. Harris, 147 Conn. 589, 590,
164 A.2d 399, 401 (1960); Elenkrieg, 238 N.Y. at 262-63, 144 N.E. at 521-22.
2 See Pollitz v. Gould, 202 N.Y. 11, 15, 94 N.E. 1088, 1089 (1911); Clark v. Bankers
Trust Co., 99 Misc. 300, 310-11, 163 N.Y.S. 748, 755 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1917); see also
United States v. Evans, 375 F.2d 730, 731 (9th Cir. 1967) (stock is equity representing own-
ership interest).
2" See Brock v. Poor, 216 N.Y. 387, 401, 111 N.E. 229, 234 (1915); First Nat'l Bank v.
Hyman Novick Realty Corp., 68 App. Div. 2d 191, 194, 416 N.Y.S.2d 844, 846 (ist Dep't
1979); Torrey Delivery, Inc. v. Chautauqua Truck Sales and Serv. Inc., 47 App. Div. 2d 279,
283, 366 N.Y.S.2d 506, 510 (4th Dep't 1975); see also Sterling-Midland Coal Co. v. Chicago-
Williamsville Coal Co., 336 Ill. 586, 587, 168 N.E. 655, 657 (1929) (shareholder cannot per-
sonally possess property, nor transfer or convey it to third party); Buffalo T.& S.D. Co. v.
Medina Gas & Elec. Light Co., 162 N.Y. 67, 76, 56 N.E. 505, 507 (1900) (sole ownership of
stock and subsequent conveyance does not affect legal title). The court in Torrey concluded
that "ownership of capital stock being distinct from ownership of corporate property, it
follows that the sale of such stock is not a sale of corporate property." 47 App. Div. 2d at
282-83, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 510; see Forrest City Mfg. Co. v. Levy, 33 S.W.2d 984, 986 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1931) (purchaser of entire stock of corporation only acquires benefit of assets); Mc-
Clory v. Schneider, 51 S.W.2d 738, 741 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) (sale of all stock not sale of
physical properties of corporation).
28 International Aircraft Trading Co. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 297 N.Y. 285, 292, 79
N.E.2d 249, 252 (1948); Jenkins v. Moyse, 254 N.Y. 319, 324, 172 N.E. 521, 522 (1930); see
also Colin v. Altman, 39 App. Div. 2d 200, 202, 333 N.Y.S.2d 432, 433 (1st Dep't 1972) (veil
can only be pierced against shareholder who is using corporation to defraud).
29 See 64 N.Y.2d at 314, 476 N.E.2d at 279, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 880.
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tack on procedural due process grounds. Both federal and state
courts have subjected provisional remedies statutes to rigorous
procedural due process scrutiny resulting in many of these statutes
being declared unconstitutional." Both courts and commentators
have scrutinized pendency statutes on procedural due process
grounds because these statutes limit the ability to alienate or fi-
nance real property without notice or a prior judicial hearing.31 Be-
20 See Hercules Chem. Co., Inc. v. VCI, Inc., 118 Misc. 2d 814, 819, 462 N.Y.S.2d 129,
133 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983) (provisional remedies statutes unconstitutional for "failure
to provide basic due process safeguards to protect against an unreasonable taking of the
defendant's property").
The Supreme Court has invalidated a number of state provisional remedies statutes on
procedural due process grounds. See, e.g., North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,
419 U.S. 601, 606 (1975) (Georgia garnishment statute violates procedural due process);
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96 (1972) ("Florida and Pennsylvania pre-judgement re-
plevin provisions work a deprivation of property without due process"); Sniadich v. Family
Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969) (garnishment procedure of Wisconsin "violates the
fundamental principles of due process"). But see Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600,
618 (1974) (upholding constitutionality of Louisiana statute that allows ex parte prejudge-
ment seizure of property). See generally L. TRmE, AmarucAN CONSTrrunONAL LAW §§ 10-14,
at 547-48 (1978) (discussing Supreme Court's analysis regarding procedural due process
scrutiny of provisional remedies statutes).
New York courts have also subjected many of its provisional remedies statutes to a
procedural due process analysis. See, e.g., Sharrock v. Dell-Buick, 45 N.Y.2d 152, 163-64,
379 N.E.2d 1169, 1174, 408 N.Y.S.2d 39, 46-47 (1978) (enforcement of garageman's lien vio-
lates due process standards); Morse Inc. v. Renter Indus. Dev. Corp., 56 App. Div. 2d 30, 37,
391 N.Y.S.2d 425, 430 (2d Dep't 1977) (mechanic's lien deemed constitutional by divided
court after rigorous due process scrutiny), afrd, 43 N.Y.2d 952, 375 N.E.2d 409, 404
N.Y.S.2d 343 (1978). See generally SIEGEL § 307, at 363-68 (1977) (discussing New York's
provisional remedies statutes and their possible unconstitutionality in light of recent Su-
preme Court decisions).
ai See Recent Decisions, Massachusetts Lis Pendens Statute and Landowners' Right
to Procedural Due Process, 16 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 263, 269-70 (1982) (Supreme Court ex-
presses no definite statement on lis pendens statute, majority of courts have subjected lis
pendens to due process analysis). Pendency statutes do not provide adequate procedural
safeguards when the following three elements exist: 1) state action; 2) a significant depriva-
tion of a property interest; and 3) lack of notice and a timely hearing. See Note, After
Malcolm v. Superior Court and Peery v. Superior Court: A Due Process Analysis of Califor-
nia Lis Pendens, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 909, 920 (1982); see also Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp.,
670 F.2d 1316, 1321-31 (3d Cir. 1982) (detailed application of three elements to New
Jersey's lis pendens statute). The majority of courts deciding on the constitutionality of lis
pendens statutes have held them to be valid for procedural due process purposes. See Note,
supra, at 920 & n.81 (citations omitted).
Notice of pendency statutes have been held to invoke sufficient state action for due
process purposes. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 670 F.2d 1316, 1327 n.7 (3d Cir.
1982) (court finds state action); Note, supra, at 920 (California case law implies lis pendens
involve state action). But see Debral Realty, Inc. v. DiChiara, 383 Mass. 589, 593, 420
N.E.2d 343, 348 (1981) ("level of State involvement in the lis pendens procedure is mini-
mal"). Additionally, courts have held that is pendens statutes deprive a property owner of a
significant property interest. See, e.g., Kukanskis v. Griffith, 180 Conn. 501, 504, 430 A.2d
1985]
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cause of the increased possibility of federal and state constitutional
attack on CPLR 6501, it is submitted that the Court's narrow in-
terpretation of the statute should be maintained in future cases.
Dennis W. Russo
INSURANCE LAW
Ins. Law § 3404: Failure to provide for shortened limitation pe-
riod in fire insurance policy results in application of the general
six-year period
Section 3404 of the Insurance Law requires that all fire insur-
ance policies issued in New York conform to a statutorily man-
dated form.1 Subsection (e) of section 3404 enables an insurer to
21, 25 (1980) ("sufficiently interferes with the alienability of real estate" for due process
purposes); Hercules Chem. Co. v. VCI, Inc., 118 Misc. 2d 814, 823, 462 N.Y.S.2d 129, 135
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983) ("interference sufficient"). But see Batey v. Digirolamo, 418 F.
Supp. 695, 697 (D. Hawaii 1976) (lis pendens not sufficient property taking). Finally, courts
have noted that many lis pendens lack adequate due process procedural safeguards. See,
e.g., Kukanskis v. Griffith, 180 Conn. 501, 504, 430 A.2d 21, 25 (1980) (Connecticut's is
pendens statute does not provide "even the barest minimum of due process protection");
Note, supra, at 928 (California lis pendens procedural safeguards "constitutionally
inadequate").
New York's pendency statute may be more susceptible to procedural due process scru-
tiny under the New York Constitution, which does not require state action for a procedural
due process violation to exist. See N.Y. CoNsT. art. I, § 6; Hercules Chem., 118 Misc. 2d at
821, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 134. "[T]he absence of any express State action language simply pro-
vides a basis to apply a more flexible State involvement requirements than is currently be-
ing imposed by the Supreme Court with respect to the Federal provision." Sharrock v. Dell-
Buick, 45 N.Y.2d 152, 160, 379 N.E.2d 1169, 1174, 408 N.Y.S.2d 39, 44 (1978). Therefore,
even if New York's pendency statute does not entail sufficient state action to trigger federal
due process protection, "it certainly is sufficient to invoke protection of due process rights
under the more flexible standard of the State constitution." Hercules Chem., 118 Misc. 2d
at 821, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 134.
1 N.Y. INs. LAW § 3404 (McKinney 1984). Section 3404 provides, in pertinent part-
(a) The printed form of a policy of fire insurance, as set forth in subsection
(e) hereof, shall be known and designated as the "standard fire insurance policy of
the state of New York."
(b)(1) No policy or contract of fire insurance shall be made, issued or deliv-
ered by any insurer or by any agent or representative thereof, on any property in
this state, unless it shall conform as to all provisions, stipulations, agreements and
